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make a quick settlement before there is any collusion between
the parties. Another design of notification clauses is to provide a
means of preventing unnecessary litigation by allowing the in-
surer to deal directly with the injured party before he feels the
need of consulting counsel. This latter consideration is the only
basis on which the defendants may have claimed prejudice in
the instant case, as all of the witnesses were on hand and there
appeared to be no evidence of collusion.
Liability insurance, besides being a benefit to the insured, is
also for the benefit of society in that the loss is distributed and
not borne by one individual. The State of Massachusetts has rec-
ognized this social problem and has attempted to solve it by re-
quiring compulsory automobile liability insurance.13  On the
basis of the decisions of the Louisiana Supreme Court only sub-
stantial compliance with provisions requiring notice seems to be
necessary. In determining this issue, an inquiry must be made
as to whether the delay has been prejudicial to the insurer. The
decisions appear to place the burden of proving substantial com-
pliance on the plaintiff. To require the insurer to prove that it
has been prejudiced by the delay in order to escape liability
would probably effectuate the social objective of Act 55 of 1930.
WADE H. DAVIS
PRESCRIPTION OF MOVABLES-MEANING OF "STOLEN" IN ARTICLES
3506 AND 3507, LOUISIANA CIVIL CODE OF 1870-A Florida automo-
bile dealer permitted a prospective customer to use one of its
automobiles for a short trip within that state. The customer,
however, drove the car to Louisiana and sold it. After the car
had passed through several hands in Louisiana, the dealer sued
the last purchaser, a possessor in good faith by just title, for its
recovery. The supreme court gave judgment for plaintiff on two
grounds: First, the sale from the prospective customer to a Louis-
iana purchaser and all other sales were nullities under Article
2452 of the Louisiana Civil Code. Second, the act of driving the
car out of Florida constituted larceny under Florida law, and
hence a good faith possessor under a just title in Louisiana could
acquire ownership only by such possession for ten years. Articles
3506 and 3509 of the Civil Code were cited to sustain the latter
position. Packard Florida Motors Company v. Malone, 24 So.
(2d) 75 (La. 1945).
13. 5 Mass. Ann. Laws (1933) c. 175, § 112. See Blanchard, Compulsory
Motor Vehicle Liability Insurance in Massachusetts (1936).
1946] NOTES
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
The question1 of revendication of movables in any jurisdic-
tion is essentially one of adjusting harmoniously to the views of
the particular society the claims of an owner who has not volun-
tarily transferred his interest as against the claims of an innocent
party who has acquired the thing in a manner which ordinarily
should entitle him to ownership. In short, the issue is one of the
security of the transaction.2 For example, in France the security
of the transaction is emphasized, while in Louisiana security of
ownership seems preferred. Under the French Civil Code the
good faith purchaser by just title acquires the ownership of the
thing immediately, unless it was lost by the owner or stolen from
him, in which case the owner may revendicate within three years
from the date of loss or theft.3 The Louisiana Civil Code provides
that if a thing be not stolen or lost, a good faith purchaser under
just title can acquire ownership through uninterrupted posses-
sion for three years.4 If the thing be stolen or lost, uninterrupted
possession for a period of ten years is necessary.5
A comparison of the two systems might show that a parallel
exists between them. Under both the owner of a thing stolen or
lost is given an opportunity to revendicate if the goods are stolen
or lost. Under each system the fact that they were stolen or lost
increases the owner's possibility of revendicating. Under both
systems, therefore, the right to revendication may depend upon
the construction given to the word "stolen." If the word "stolen"
is made to include, for example, all acts prejudicial to ownership,
1. Assuming for the sake of this discussion that the case was to be de-
cided wholly upon the basis of Louisiana law (the conflicts of laws problem
in this case will not be discussed for it is the sole purpose of the writer to
consider the meaning to be given to the word "stolen" in Articles 3506 and
3507 of the La. Civil Code), there was no need for the court to consider
whether the automobile had been stolen; for this consideration can come
into play only if the possessor in good faith and by just title has possessed
for more than three years. In this case the various possessors had held
the automobile for a period of less than three years, and therefore if Louisi-
ana law was to apply the plaintiff should have been entitled to recover
whether the automobile had been stolen or not. But the court did, as a
matter of fact, interpret the word stolen In Article 3506 as possibly including
offenses against ownership as well as offenses against possession.
2. Franklin, Security of Acquisition and of Transaction: La possession
vant titre and Bona Fide Purchase (1932) 6 Tulane L. Rev. 589.
3. Art. 2279, French Civil Code: "With respect to movables, possession is
equivalent to title. Nevertheless, he who has lost a thing, or from whom a
thing has been stolen, has three years within which to reclaim it, commenc-
ing on date of the loss or theft, from anyone who has it in his custody;
saving to the latter his recourse against the person from whom he obtainedit.,,
. 4. Art. 3506, La. Civil Code of 1870: '"If a person has possessed in good
faith and by just title, as owner, a movable thing, during three successive
years without interruption, he shall acquire the ownership of it by prescrip-
tion unless the thing was stolen or lost."
5. Art. 3509, La. Civil Code of 1870.
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the possibility of revendication is increased. On the other hand,
if "stolen" is limited to involuntary deprivations of possession, the
possibility of revendication is to that extent limited.
A search through Louisiana jurisprudence has revealed no
case in which the meaning of the word "stolen" was at issue, and
the dicta have been conflicting. Upon consideration of the dictum
in Campbell v. Nicholse one must conclude that "stolen" does not
include the case where the owner of a thing has voluntarily
surrendered possession. In contrast, dictum in Security Sales
Company v. Blackwell7 expresses the opinion that a thing ille-
gally transferred by a purchaser under a conditional sale agree-
ment would be "assimilated" to a thing "stolen."
The French writers in discussing the point indicate that
"stolen" has always been, and even now is, limited to cases where
the owner has been involuntarily dispossessed. In instances
where the owner voluntarily has surrendered possession of the
thing, as in cases of escrow, deposit, loan or lease, he is not al-
lowed to revendicate the movable. He is limited to a personal
remedy in damages against the party to whom the owner sur-
rendered possession." In Article 464 of the Spanish Civil Code'
it is said that one who has lost or has been "involuntarily de-
prived" of a thing may recover it; but the word "stolen" itself is
used later in the article apparently as the equivalent of "unlaw-
fully deprived," so that one might conclude that the modern
Spanish law is similar to the French. The ancient Spanish law
as stated in Las Siete Partidas1° appears to be in accord, for it
refers to "theft, robbery, or violence."
An additional reason for not extending the meaning of the
word "stolen" is that, prior to 1942 that term, as used in our
criminal law, had not included all acts which constituted mere
abuse of confidence, embezzlement or obtaining property by false
pretenses. The modem theft statute does cover all "misappro-
priations" and "taking" from the owner.11 Certainly from a his-
torical viewpoint there is no need for adopting the broad mean-
6. 11 Rob. 16 (La. 1845).
7. 167 La. 667, 120 So. 45 (1928).
8. 3 Planiol et Ripert, Trait6 Pratique de Droit Civil Frangais (1926)
374-376, §§ 390-392.
9. Art. 464, Spanish Civil Code.
10. Part 3, title 29, law 4.
11. Art. 67, La. Crim. Code of 1942: "Theft is the misappropriation or
taking of anything of value which belongs to another, either without the
consent of the other to the misappropriation or taking, or by means of
fraudulent conduct, practices or representations. An intent to deprive the
other permanently of whatever may be the subject of the misappropriation
or taking is essential ... "
19461
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ing of "stolen" as given in the principal case, for the historical
meaning of the word has been limited to cases where the owner
has not voluntarily dispossessed himself. Looking at the problem
from the social and economic need of today, such a broad inter-
pretation is not necessary. Due to the numerous and rapid trans-
fers of movables under modern trade conditions, emphasis should
be given "security of transaction" without unduly sacrificing "se-
curity of acquisition." Surely a delimitation of the word "stolen"
in Articles 3506 and 3507 would be more in accord with the needs
of our time. Under it one who voluntarily surrenders possession
has at least three years in which to bring suit; one who has been
wrongfully deprived of possession has ten years. This is even
more time than may be necessary for an alert owner to repossess
his property.
ROBERT L. COLLINGS
